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This study verifies the influence of corporate tax aggressiveness on 
replacing the Chief Executive Officer - CEO. Tax Aggressiveness can be a 
determinant of CEO turnover in companies listed on the Brazilian stock 
exchange B3. Efficient tax planning is essential for any organization, being 
a manager's duty to avoid paying unnecessary taxes. Methodologically, the 
study uses three tax aggressiveness metrics to verify the nature of this 
relationship from 2010 to 2016, ranking the results by quintile and identifying 
the high and low extremes of tax aggressiveness. Also, control variables 
were used to reduce the bias of the proposed regression. Two of the proxies 
of tax aggressiveness, Cash Effective Tax Rate Long Run Effective Tax 
Rate, showed significant low tax aggressiveness. The results evidence that 
less tax aggressive CEOs are more likely to be replaced. For managers, the 
findings reinforce that tax planning is a determinant factor to remain in the 
position. 
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1 Introdution 
 
Studies show that some companies maintain effective low tax rates for a long time, while others maintain 
consistent rates that meet or exceed the statutory or legally anticipated rate (Dyreng, Hanlon & Maydew, 2008; 
Blouin, 2014). For these authors, this behavior can be attributed, at least in part, to the CEO and their sensitivity 
to fiscal risk. Other studies reveal that reputational costs are limiting factors, determining how far businesses 
and managers are willing to minimize their effective tax rates (Desai & Dharmapala, 2006; Cheng, Huang, Li & 
Stanfield, 2012). 
The tax issue may lead to corporate leadership changes, influencing, for instance, a board's decision to 
replace the company's CEO. In this context, this research intends to empirically verify if companies' tax 
aggressiveness influences CEO turnover in Brazilian companies. Therefore, this study aims to identify whether 
high or low tax aggressiveness explains, in part, the replacement of CEOs in companies listed on the Brazilian 
stock exchange B3. In other words, would the tax planning be a determinant factor to the CEO remain in his 
position? 
Similar research by Chyz and Gaertner (2018), applied to the North American market, found evidence 
that CEOs bear reputational penalties to avoid paying taxes. The authors also observed that CEOs who are not 
enough tax aggressive are more likely to be replaced. The studies by Armstrong, Blouin, and Larcker (2012), 
Rego and Wilson (2012), Gaertner (2014), and Powers, Robinson, and Stomberg (2016) found relationships 
between CEO compensation and tax aggressiveness in US companies. Graham, Hanlon, Shevlin, and Shroff 
(2013) found that reputation costs (often referred to as non-tax related expenses) are important factors that limit 
CEOs tax aggressiveness, which is corroborated with evidence produced by Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) and 
Graham et al. (2013). 
The research by Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) supports the idea that stock prices are negatively impacted 
when news shows that companies participate in transactions in tax havens. Shareholders (and board members) 
want managers to adopt the best tax planning, balancing the benefits between tax avoidance and the costs 
generated by this practice. 
Brazilian accounting literature has not explored the relationship between tax aggressiveness and CEO 
turnover. The hypothesis is that highly tax-aggressive CEOs would be more likely to be replaced since they bring 
an excessive tax risk to the company, which can be expressed in fines. However, the CEO who tolerates 
significant tax burdens by reducing profitability would also be exposed to a replacement due to negligence in 
dealing with tax issues. The particularities of Brazil suggest the need to replicate the research carried out in the 
American market. The application of such experiments in the Brazilian context, marked as an emerging capital 
market with legal constraints (substantially different from the American reality), can bring completely different 
results. Therefore, this study gains importance not only because of the originality when addressing a different 
context from the USA but also because it may inspire other researchers to examine emerging markets on the 
issue. 
Methodologically, the study used three tax aggressiveness metrics, classifying the quintile results and 
identifying the high and low extremes of tax aggressiveness. Additionally, control variables were used to 
determine other possible effects on the dependent variable.  
This study is divided into five parts, including this introduction. The next section presents the theoretical 
framework, introducing a literature review. The third section shows the methodology adopted, followed by 
analyzing the regression results and the conclusion. 
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2.1 Tax aggressiveness 
 
Studies on tax aggressiveness have increased significantly worldwide. There are, however, relevant 
gaps to be filled (Martinez, 2017), particularly in Brazil, where research in this area and focused on Brazilian 
companies is in its early stages (Araújo & Leite Filho, 2017). 
There is no definition in Brazilian law or other administrative regulations regarding the meaning of legal, 
illegal (abusive), or aggressive tax planning (Schoueri & Galendi Júnior, 2017). Companies always have doubts 
about what can be done when it comes to reducing, delaying, or avoiding the incidence of taxes. There is a 
particular legal uncertainty in Brazil due to a confusing interpretation of tax authorities that can classify tax 
planning practices as simulation and fraud (Martinez & Coelho, 2016). 
For companies and shareholders, excellent tax planning includes reducing tax costs, reflecting an 
increase in cash flow and net income (Blouin, 2014). The primary purpose of tax planning is to minimize tax 
obligations. The extent of tax aggressiveness will depend on the level of intensity and legality of how these 
practices are adopted, reflecting a significant reduction in explicit taxes (Martinez, 2017). 
Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) define tax aggressiveness as the set of practices that reduce or avoid 
taxes, resulting in tax benefits. This approach does not distinguish legal from illegal, fraudulent, or legally dubious 
tax practices, but it exposes the company to the risks related to the tax agent interpretation. 
More tax aggressive companies use every opportunity to obtain tax reduction. When these operations 
are under legal uncertainty or open to interpretation, the firms tend to opt for more advantageous tax practices, 
seeking tax savings, even though tax agents may interpret the patterns as abusive, representing a legal risk 
(Martinez, 2017).  
 
2.2 Tax aggressiveness in Brazil 
 
For Martinez (2017), greater tax aggressiveness does not imply tax abuse. However, there are risks that 
a sharp reduction in explicit tax obligations may indicate the use of controversial or illegal practices. In Brazil, 
the recognition of abusive tax planning is subject to debate. Brazilian law consists of distinguishing tax evasion 
(simulated schemes) from authentic tax planning. However, what is observed in administrative courts such as 
the Administrative Tax Appeals Council (CARF) are decisions about tax cases where the council focuses on the 
form and the use of practices that seem to "abuse of law" in some tax cases judged by CARF (Schoueri & 
Freitas, 2010). Martinez (2017) argues that as tax aggressiveness increases, so does the risk that tax authorities 
may disregard certain transactions. 
Figure 1 below by Lietz (2013) adapted by Martinez (2017) illustrates the types of tax planning and the 
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Figure 1: Level of tax aggressiveness and tax planning 
 
Source: Lietz (2013) 
Note: Adapted by Martinez (2017) 
 
Some studies on the reasons to engage in aggressive tax planning, point to elements such as the 
corporate policy regarding bonuses to executives (which leads to strategies to increasing profit to raise their 
bonus gains), and the policy of paying executives with stocks (which leads them to take higher risks seeking to 
obtain higher returns) (Francis, Hasan, Qiang & Meng, 2014). According to Bertrand and Schoar (2003), 
executives' management of incentives tends to influence the companies' tax aggressiveness. 
 
2.3 Proxies to measure tax aggressiveness 
 
Many articles have developed metrics to assess tax aggressiveness, focusing on explicit taxes, 
regardless of whether the tax outcome is too aggressive or legally controversial (Brown, 2011; Hanlon & 
Heitzman, 2010; Lisowsky, 2010; Wilson, 2009). 
Martinez (2017) points out that metrics of tax aggressiveness are focused on the company's accounting 
results, which in Brazil are based on revenue taxes (IRPJ) and the contribution on net profit (CSLL) (both taxes 
levied on profit). When considering that Brazil adopts a variety of direct and indirect taxes, studies only analyze 
taxes based on profit narrows the relevance of their conclusions. 
The research by Frank, Lynch, and Rego (2009) adopt the Book-Tax Differences (BTD) – the result of 
the difference between accounting profit and tax profit – as a measure of tax aggressiveness. However, BTD is 
a biased measure since earnings management strongly influences the proxy's results (Ferreira, Martinez, Costa, 
& Passamani, 2012). 
According to Hanlon & Heitzman (2010), the most widely used proxy for tax aggressiveness is the 
effective tax rate on accounting profit (ETR), which verifies the total expense with income tax, divided by the 
profit before income tax. A low ETR indicates that the company is more tax aggressive. Medeiros and Costa 
(2017) recommend an adjustment to the ETR that is more compatible with the Brazilian reality, where profit 
before income tax is added by the reversal interest rate on capital (registered against net equity as determined 
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by Brazilian securities commission (CVM) – Resolution 207/1996) and the adjustments regarding the equity 
method. 
A metric adopted in this research is the Total Value Added Tax (TVAT), which is the product of the tax 
of the value-added statement (VAS) divided by the total value added to distribute. A Brazilian metric, with no 
comparison with international studies (Da Silva & Martinez, 2017), the TVAT is part of the VAS. It is different 
from the most common global metrics in the literature, which only use data from the income statement. It is a 
metric that enables capturing a broader result of tax aggressiveness compared to the ETR proxy. It measures 
aggressiveness in several aspects since it works with all the taxes (federal, state, and local) levied on sales 
(Fernandes, Martinez, & Nossa, 2013). According to Martinez (2017), TVAT is better than the traditional ETR, 
even though it has limits based on the possibility to capture a broad spectrum of taxes, than only taxes from 
income. For instance, TVAT includes indirect taxes, and many of them are passed on to the consumer.  
 
2.4 CEO turnover 
 
Although the Brazilian stock market is small and its ownership is more concentrated, it is possible to 
observe a tendency to replace the companies' leadership when performance is considered insufficient (Matos & 
Colauto, 2017). CEO turnover is related to internal monitoring by companies' shareholders, controllers, and 
creditors (Mellone Júnior & Saito, 2004). 
Companies with adequate governance structure, counting on the disciplining power exercised by a 
board of directors, are more likely to replace low-performing executives (Mendes-da-Silva & Grzybovski, 2006). 
There is also evidence that higher-indebted organizations present higher CEO turnover (Dani, Carmosa, & Hein, 
2015). 
Companies with an independent board or that adopt a fully independent nominating committee 
significantly increase their CEO turnover when the executives fail to achieve the expected performance (Guo & 
Masulis, 2015). 
There are several studies in international literature addressing the issue of CEO turnover (Table 1): 
 
Table 1: International studies on CEO turnover  
ARTICLE RESULTS REFERENCE 
Turnover threat and CEO risk-
taking behavior in the banking 
industry 
CEOs of the World Bank increase risk-taking when there is a 
moderate turnover threat and reduce risk-taking when they observe 
a higher possibility of being replaced.  
Chen and Ebrahim 
(2018) 
An Empirical Investigation on 
CEO Turnover in IT Firms and 
Firm Performance  
CEO turnover is a significant determinant of the company's 
performance, particularly in the IT sector.  
Zhang, Wierschem, 
Mediavilla, an Hong 
(2016) 
Board Structure and Monitoring: 
New Evidence from CEO 
Turnovers 
More board independency and total independence of nominating 
committees lead to more rigorous monitoring and discipline 
regarding CEO performance. 
Lixiong and Masulis 
(2015) 
Executive pay matters: looking 
beyond the CEO to explore 
implications of pay disparity on 
non-CEO executive turnover and 
firm performance 
The position as executive greatly influences the probability of 
turnover and the company's performance.  
Pissaris, Heavey, and 
Golden (2017) 
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Financial performance and non‐
family CEO turnover in private 
family firms under different 
conditions of ownership and 
governance 
When a family business is concentrated with few family members or 
few members of the family participating on the board, the CEOs who 
are family members are less likely to be replaced after showing low 
performance.  
Visitin, Pittino, and 
Minichilli  (2017) 
Managerial Labor Market during 
Institutional Transition: A study 
of CEO compensation and 
voluntary turnover 
CEOs who have compensation that is lower than the expected are 
associated with voluntary turnover in China.  
He, Shaw, and Fang 
(2017) 
CEO turnover in large banks: 
Does tail risk matter? 
Systematic risk is only essential for CEO turnover if there is a 
significant variation in the costs that this risk represents to 
shareholders and the organization, 
Srivastav, Keasey, 
Mollah, and Vallascas 
(2017)  
The Effect of Ex-ante CEO 
Turnover Risk on Firms' 
Discretionary Expenditures  
The risk of CEO turnover leads to weak decisions. These decisions 
will hinder the company's value. Companies sometimes maintain 
low-performance managers and face the consequences of soft 
choices that jeopardize the company's performance in the long 
term. 
Changu, Hyung, 
Byungjin, and Seungwon 
(2018)  
The impact of family owners' 
monitoring on CEO turnover 
decisions and the role of trust 
Owners of family companies can immediately replace a low-
performance CEO only when the CEO is an external professional, 
not a family member. 
Rizzotti and Mazzone 
(2017) 
 
According to the theoretical framework presented, the research examines the organizations listed in the 
Brazilian stock exchange B3 from 2010 to 2016, observing their tax aggressiveness and CEO turnover. Based 
on the international literature analyzed, the hypotheses tested in this study are: 
H1: CEO turnover increases when the company is very tax aggressive. 




This study seeks to identify the influence of corporate tax aggressiveness on CEO turnover using 
multivariate statistical analysis techniques. The proxies chosen as metrics for tax aggressiveness are:  i) 
CASH_ETR, based on Dyreng et al. (2010), which is the amount the company disbursed to pay taxes, excluding 
deferred income tax; ii) ETR_LONGRUN, which is the total tax paid in the last three years; and iii) the product 
of the tax at the value-added statement (VAS) on the value-added (TVAT), which is a proxy that better captures 
the Brazilian reality regarding the level of the organizations' tax aggressiveness. 
The study examines tax aggressiveness from companies listed on the Brazilian stock exchange B3, 
except financial firms, from 2010 to 2016. Financial firms are excluded from the analysis because they have 
unique tax structures and rates.  Data about CEO turnover was obtained from the companies' reference report 
(document required by B3) and collected at the CVM online platform. Influenced by the work by Chyz & Gaertner 
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The research uses VAS data, a better metric for tax aggressiveness, considering the Brazilian context 
(Martinez, 2017). It analyzes the federal, state, and local sales taxes, rather than only on income taxes. The 
publication of the VAS has been mandatory since 2010, and this study analyzes the documents released from 
2010 to 2016. The information about CEO turnover was examined until 2017. 
Data on CEO turnover were collected in each company's reference form, published in CVM's online 
platform. The VAS data were obtained from the standard financial statement for each company/year and 
disclosed on the CVM's online platform. Other corporate financial data were collected from the Economática 
database. The study uses panel data with a sample size company/year that oscillates according to the metrics' 
availability on tax aggressiveness. 
 
3.1 Metrics for tax aggressiveness 
 
The proxies used to measure tax aggressiveness are presented in Table 2: 
Table 2: Metrics on tax aggressiveness        
Variable Description Reference 
CASH_ETRit  
𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑡−1+𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑥-𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑡 
Profit before income tax (PBIT) 
Chyz and Gaertner 
(2018) 
ETR_LONGRUNit 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝐼𝑅𝑃𝐽 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑡+ 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝐼𝑅𝑃𝐽 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑡−1 





Total tax in the VAS 
Total value-added 
Motta and Martinez 
(2015) 
 
The first proxy used for tax aggressiveness was the CASH_ETR, which is the measure that calculates 
the amount of taxes paid by firms to accounting profit. CASH_ETR expresses the amount the company paid and 
is established for each company/year. (Armstrong et al., 2015). CASH_ETR is used instead of ETR because it 
is closer to what the company paid to pay taxes in a given year. 
The second proxy was the ETR_LONGRUN, which measures the company's total taxes in the last three 
years, thus excluding deferred tax. It provides a more dynamic measure of tax aggressiveness, including a more 
extended period, not just a single year such as the CASH_ETR. 
The third metric of tax aggressiveness was the TVAT, which encompasses taxes on sales, a type of tax 
characteristic of the Brazilian context. That represents the majority of the company's tax burden (Motta & 
Martinez, 2015). 
The use of this set of metrics sought to capture the variation in the company's tax planning and tax 
avoidance compared to other companies of the same size, sector, and year. 
 
3.2 Regression Model 
 
The following regression inspired by the study by Chyz and Gaertner (2018) was applied:  
𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡+1 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +
 𝛽2𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽 ∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡
6
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  Table 3: Regression model        
Variable Description 
CEO Turnover 
It is the dependent variable that identifies whether there was CEO turnover in the company. It 
is 1 for the company/year where the CEO was replaced and 0 when there was no CEO 
turnover. 
High tax aggressiveness 
It is an explanatory variable, equals 1 for observations in the lower quintile of tax 
aggressiveness and 0 for other observations. 
Low tax aggressiveness 
It is an explanatory variable, equals 1 for observations in the highest annual quintile of tax 
aggressiveness, and 0 for other observations. 
Controls Control variables. 
Ε Error variable. 
 
In the regression model, 𝛽1 is the coefficient of high tax aggressiveness, and 𝛽2 is the coefficient of low 
tax aggressiveness. 
Equation 1 reports a logit panel regression model's marginal effects where the dependent variable is 
CEO turnover. Linear probability models generate estimates of a binary dependent variable. This design choice 
helps the economic interpretation of the coefficient of interest of this study. The definitions of the equation 
variables are as follows: CEOTurnover is the variable that indicates whether there was a CEO replacement in 
the company (it equals 1 for company/years where there was the event, and 0 when there is no CEO turnover. 
So, for any occasion where there was no CEO turnover in the panel company/year, the variable CEOTurnover 
was attributed 0. For example, if the company 'A' replaced the CEO in 2011, it was attributed 1 for CEOTurnover 
for that year. If the same company did not replace its CEO in 2012, the variable was considered 0.  
High tax aggressiveness is an explanatory variable that equals 1 for observations in the lowest quintile 
of CASH_ETR/ETR_LONGRUN/TVAT, and 0 for other observations; low tax aggressiveness is an explanatory 
variable that equals 1 for observations in the highest annual quintile of CASH_ETR/ETR_LONGRUN/TVAT, and 
0 for other observations; I is a fixed effect vector of industry sector; T is a fixed effect vector of the year, 𝛽0 is 
an intercept, 𝛽1 is the coefficient of high tax aggressiveness, 𝛽2 is the coefficient of low tax aggressiveness, 
and ε is the error variable. The model and current results are estimated separately for CASH_ETR (Chyz & 
Gaertner, 2018), TVAT (Da Silva & Martinez, 2017; Motta & Martinez, 2015), and ETR_LONGRUN (Hanlon & 
Heitzman, 2010). The use of quintile is compatible with the use in the literature for the extreme position in tax 
aggressiveness  
Hypothesis 1 states that CEO turnover is more likely to happen in companies with a relatively low 
effective tax rate. In regression (1), the hypothesis should be supported by a positive and significant 
𝛽1 coefficient. 
Hypothesis 2 states that CEO turnover is more likely to happen in companies with a relatively high 
effective tax rate. In regression (1), the hypothesis should be supported by a positive and significant  𝛽2 
coefficient. 
A set of control variables was added, using variables already adopted in previous accounting research, 
which tends to influence CEO turnover (Menon & Williams, 2008). 
 
    Table 4: Control variables        
Variable Description Reference 
SIZE 
Size of the company, established by the natural log of the 
company's total asset in the previous year. 
Hamori and Koyuncu (2015). 
DeltaROA 
Return on current assets before taxes, minus return on 
assets before taxes in the previous year. 
Zajac (1990) 
LEV Long term debt related to total assets. Jianxin and Yuching (2011) 
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State control 




Previous studies report that company size (SIZE) tends to influence CEO turnover (Hamori & Koyuncu, 
2015). Return on assets (DeltaROA) variation is well known and widely used to measure CEO turnover research 
(Zajac, 1990). Financial Leverage (LEV) is another variable that tends to influence CEO turnover (Jianxin & 
Yuching, 2011). State control may affect the likelihood of CEO turnover regarding political issues not related to 
performance. 
 
4 Results Analysis 
 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 5 presents the descriptive statistics of the observations, covering the periods from 2010 to 2016. 
The independent variables of high and low tax aggressiveness are listed, together with the control variables: 
Return on asset variation (DeltaROA), leverage (LEV), company size (SIZE), and state control. 
Table 5 also shows the observations (the number of information contained in the database, considering 
each variable's company/year). The mean and standard deviation, the minimum and maximum values, and the 
1st and 3rd quartile of the sample are also indicated in the table. 
 





deviation Min. 1st Quartil 3rd Quartil Max.  
HTAcash_etr 5384 0.08 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
LTAcash_etr 5384 0.76 0.43 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
HTAetr_longrun 5384 0.18 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
LTAetr_longrun 5384 0.52 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
HTAtvat 5384 0.08 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
LTAtvat 5384 0.66 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
SIZEw 3279 13.43 3.05 2.20 12.41 15.30 18.23 
DeltaROAw 3226 -2.32 102.65 -614.78 -3.54 2.07 601.27 
LEVw 2996 202.25 1512.59 0.00 0.04 2.01 13678.91 
StateControl 3703 0.05 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
CEOTurnover 3703 0.57 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Note: HTAcash_etr, HTAetr_longrun, HTAtvat are binary variables of high tax aggressiveness, of different tax aggressiveness 
metrics. LTAcash_etr, LTAetr_longrun, LTAtvat are binary variables of low tax aggressiveness of different metrics of tax 
aggressiveness. SIZE: company size, established by the natural log of the asset in the previous year. DeltaROA: variation of the 
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return on assets. LEV: Leverage. StateControl: binary variable of state control. CEOTurnover: binary dependent variable of CEO 
turnover. To minimize the effects of the outliers in variables SIZE, DeltaROA, and LEV, the Winsor estimator was used (1% in each 
distribution tail) 
 
The variables HTAcash_etr, HTAetr_longrun, HTAtvat are binary independent variables, where 1 
represents the high tax aggressiveness and 0 the opposite. This result is found by applying a quintile in the 
CASH_ETR, ETR_LONGRUN, and TVAT variables where companies in the lowest quintile (0% to 20%) are 
classified as highly tax aggressive. 
The variables LTAcash_etr, LTAetr_longrun, LTAtvat are binary independent variables, where 1 
represents low tax aggressiveness and 0 the opposite. This result is found by applying a quintile to the 
CASH_ETR, ETR_LONGRUN, and TVAT variables, where companies in the highest quintile (80% to 100%) are 
classified as less tax aggressive. 
The STATA Winsor command was used on the DeltaROA, LEV, and SIZE variables for adjustments of 
possible outliers. The values 1% in the limit of the left tail and 1% in the right limit were changed by values close 
to the extremes. No exceptional observations were rejected, and the values were changed to a similar and 
reliable observation. Indispensably, the winsorized variables' size must be the same as the originals collected; 
thus, the averages are more stable (Turkey, 1962). 
The variable size (SIZE) resulted in a mean of 13.43, with values ranging from a minimum of 2.2 to a 
maximum of 18.23. For the variable return on assets variation (DeltaROA), an average value of -2.32 was 
obtained, with values ranging from a minimum of -614.78 to a maximum of 601.27. Regarding the leverage 
variable (LEV), an average weight of 202.25 was found, with values ranging from a minimum of 0 to a maximum 
of 13,678.91. 
The StateControl variable is a binary variable related to the state's control over the company, where 1 
is attributed to companies that are state-owned enterprises and 0 for the opposite. The variable CEOTurnover 
is the regression dependent variable, where 1 is attributed to companies that had CEO turnover and 0 the 
opposite 
 
4.2 Correlation matrix 
 
The correlation matrix in table 6 showed the correlation between the variables of the proposed model, 
observing the tax aggressiveness metric CASH_ETR. 
Table 6: Correlation matrix using CASH_ETR as metrics to tax aggressiveness 
 CEOTurnover HTAcash_etr LTAcash_etr StateControl SIZE DeltaROA LEV 
CEOTurnover 1.0000       
HTAcash_etr 0.0660*** 1.0000      
LTAcash_etr -0.1372*** -0.4066*** 1.0000     
Statecontrol -0.0106 -0.0294* 0.0186 1.0000    
SIZE -0.0103 -0.0369** -0.2110*** 0.1445*** 1.0000   
DeltaROA 0.0050 0.0138 0.0081 -0.0180 -0.0692*** 1.0000  
LEV -0.0074 0.0281 0.0772*** -0.0247 -0.3273*** -0.0374* 1.0000 
Note: ***, ** and * significant at the levels 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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Table 6 highlights the relationship of the high tax aggressiveness (HTAcash_etr) and low tax 
aggressiveness (LTAcash_etr) variables, with the dependent variable CEOTurnover as a 99% significance 
index. 
The correlation matrix in Table 7 shows the correlation between the proposed model's variables, using 
the tax aggressiveness metric ETR_LONGRUN. 
 
             Table 7: Correlation matrix using CASH_ETR as metrics to tax aggressiveness 
Identificação do 
viés 
Retorno acima da média 
Controle sobre 
investimentos 
Relação com outros motoristas 
Frequência Percentual Frequência Percentual Frequência Percentual 
Presença do viés 208 53% 206 52% 276 70% 
Ausência do viés 187 47% 189 48% 119 30% 
            Note: ***, ** and * significant at the levels 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
Table 7 highlights the low tax aggressiveness variable (LTAetr_longrun) with the dependent variable, 
CEOTurnover, as a 95% significance index. 
A correlation matrix was developed for the tax aggressiveness metric TVAT. There was no correlation 
between the dependent variable CEOTurnover and the model's independent variables: high tax aggressiveness 
and low tax aggressiveness, as shown in Table 8.  
 
Table 8 – Correlation matrix using TVAT as metric of tax aggressiveness                        
  CEOTurnover HTAtvat LTAtvat StateControl SIZE DeltaROA LEV 
CEOTiurnover 1.0000       
HTAtvat 0.0295 1.0000      
LTAtvat -0.0187 -0.3825*** 1.0000     
StateControl -0.0106 -0.0217 0.0495*** 1.0000    
SIZE -0.0103 -0.0647*** -0.1590***  0.1445* 1.0000   
DeltaROA 0.0050 -0.0149 0.0158 -0.018 -0.0692* 1.0000  
LEV -0.0074 0.0627*** 0.0862*** -0.0247 -0.3273* -0.0374* 1.0000 
Note: ***, ** and * significant at the levels 1%, 5% and 10% respectively  
 
The correlation matrix with significant variables between CEO turnover and high and low aggressiveness 
indicators shows the potential for a significant relationship between the variables. However, the robust results 
are those presented by multivariate regressions. 
 
4.3 Results of regression 
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For the regression model, the data were studied using the three metrics on tax aggressiveness: 
CASH_ETR, ETR_LONGRUN, and TVAT. Three statistical methods were used to estimate the data: ordinary 
least squares, panel regression, and logit regression, for each of the tax aggressiveness metrics. The most 
accurate method was panel logit regression, with the fixed effect of the company and year. 
According to the panel logit regression model with fixed effect 'company and year,' using the CASH_ETR 
tax aggressiveness metric, the model was estimated based on 6 interactions and counting 2,250 observations. 
 
 Table 9: Results of regression with CASH_ETR 
CEOTurnover Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
StateControl -0.167118 0.1971136 -0.85 0.397 -0.5534536 0.2192176 
HTAFcash_etr -0.0232353 0.1402686 -0.17 0.868 -0.2981566 0.251686 
LTAcash_etr 0.1789121 0.1011695 1.77 0.077* -0.0193765 0.3772006 
SIZEw -0.0244108 0.0168523 -1.45 0.147 -0.0574408 0.0086191 
DeltaROAw 0.0037287 0.0303469 0.12 0.902 -0.0557501 0.0632075 
LEVw 0.0016042 0.0232155 0.07 0.945 -0.0438973 0.0471057 
 Note: * relation at 90% confidence interval 
 
Table 9 presents the result of the regression using CASH_ETR as a tax aggressiveness metric, pointing 
out only one variable that was related to CEO turnover, LTA (low tax aggressiveness), with 90% confidence 
represented by its p-value ( P>|z|) less than 10% (0.077). The estimated ratio is approximately 18% (0.1789121), 
meaning that with each 1% increase in the degree of low tax aggressiveness, the CEO will have an additional 
18% chance of being replaced. However, one cannot discard the variable SIZE, which presented a relevant 
result for its p-value (P>|z|) of 0.147. 
For the logit panel regression model, with the company and year's fixed effect and adopting the tax 
aggressiveness metric ETR_LONGRUN, six interactions were used to estimate the model, counting 2,544 
observations. 
 
Table 10: Results of regression with ETR_LONGRUN  
CEOTurnover Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
StateControl -0.0493924 0.1871823 -0.26 0.792 -0.416263 0.3174783 
HTAetr_long -0.1403001 0.102867 -1.36 0.173 -0.3419157 0.0613155 
LTAetr_long 0.1898604 0.1059129 1.79 0.073* -0.0177251 0.3974459 
SIZE -0.0068916 0.0156358 -0.44 0.659 -0.0375373 0.023754 
DeltaROA -0.0005962 0.000397 -1.50 0.133 -0.0013744 0.000182 
LEV 0.000042 0.0000334 1.26 0.208 -0.0000234 0.0001075 
Note: * relation at 90% confidence interval 
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Table 10 presents only one variable related to CEO turnover, LTA (low tax aggressiveness), with 90% 
confidence represented by its p-value (P>|z|) below 10% (0.073). The estimated ratio is approximately 19%, i.e., 
for each 1% increase in the degree of low tax aggressiveness, there are 19% chances of CEO replacement. 
However, one cannot discard the DeltaROA variable, which presented a relevant result for its p-value (P>|z|) of 
0.133. According to the panel logit regression model, with the fixed effect of company and year, using the TVAT 
tax aggressiveness metric, six interactions were used to estimate the model, counting on 2,544 observations. 
Table 11 shows the regression results using the TVAT tax aggressiveness metric, not related to any 
model variable with 99, 95, and 90% confidence, represented by its p-value (P>|z|) lower than 10, 5, and 1%. 
However, one cannot discard the variable DeltaROA that presented a relevant result for its p-value (P>|z|) of 
0.134, and the LEV that also showed a relevant result for its p-value (P>|z|) of 0.166. 
 
Table 11: Results of regression with TVAT  
CEOTurnover Coeff. Std.Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
StateControl -0.0736107 0.187 -0.390 0.695 -0.441046 0.2938246 
HTAtvat -0.0685431 0.1300795 -0.530 0.598 -0.3234942 0.186408 
LTAtvat 0.0365225 0.0935233 0.390 0.696 -0.1467798 0.2198248 
SIZE -0.0045730 0.0156745 -0.290 0.770 -0.0352944 0.0261484 
DeltaROA -0.0005994 0.0004004 -1.500 0.134 -0.0013842 0.0001854 
LEV 0.0000461 0.0000333 1.380 0.166 -0.0000192 0.0001115 
 
The results corroborate the findings obtained by Chyz and Gaertner (2018), evidencing that CEOs who 
are not sufficiently tax aggressive are more likely to be replaced. Despite there being legal uncertainties 
regarding tax avoidance, CEOs in Brazil prefer to pay fewer taxes even though the practice may incur 
reputational penalties, avoiding being replaced.   
Besides, a test for omitted variables was performed to check if an explanatory variable was missing in 
the model, ensuring that the model is well specified. One of the premises of the linear regression model is that 
variables X and Y are linearly related. The Ramsey-RESET (1969) test revealed that in H0, there are no omitted 
variables, and the model is well specified, i.e., X and Y are linearly related. In H1, the model has omitted 
variables, which generates a bias in the coefficient estimates. The command estatovtest in the STATA software 
was used to carry out this test. As p-value> 5% in all OLS models, this problem was not detected, and this test 




This study verified whether more or less tax-aggressive Brazilian companies tend to change the CEO. 
Methodologically, from the data collected from the ECONOMÁTICA and CVM database from 2010 to 2016, the 
research conducted a multiple linear regression among the dependent variable CEOTurnover, the explanatory 
variables high and low tax aggressiveness, and the control variables (StateControl, SIZE, DeltaROA, and LEV), 
which sought to avoid bias in the results. 
Three tax aggressiveness metrics based on the literature were used (CASH_ETR, ETR_LONGRUN, 
and TVAT). The results of these metrics were classified in a quintile, which made it possible to highlight 
companies that were less or highly tax aggressive. The result analysis observed that the metric TVAT did not 
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present significant results. However, the proxies of tax aggressiveness CASH_ETR and ETR_LONGRUN 
showed significant results for low tax aggressiveness (LTA). 
The research found that CEO turnover is sensitive to the outcome of the CASH_ETR and 
ETR_LONGRUN metrics. When analyzing all taxes using the TVAT metric (which considers indirect taxes), no 
correlation was found between the variables tax aggressiveness and CEOTurnover.  Why could this non-
significance have occurred? A possible hypothesis for this would be why a decision is made on the Income 
Statement and not on the VAS. Another possible theory has to do with the metric itself. This VAS metric captures 
the effect of all taxes, including sales taxes, but the company does not owe these taxes: they are collected from 
customers and passed on to the government. On the other hand, the taxes on income are due to the company. 
Therefore, the focus, apparently, maybe on these taxes, and therefore, there may have been the statistical 
significance of the variable LTA to the two ETR regressions. 
Overall, the results show evidence that CEOs with a profile related to low tax aggressiveness are more 
likely to be replaced. The findings reinforce the relevance of tax planning as a determining factor to remain in 
managers' position. 
This study's limitation is related to the fact that it works only with companies listed on the Brazilian stock 
exchange B3, which is a small number of organizations (just over 500). In more developed markets, such as in 
the US, there are more than 3,000 listed companies. 
Finally, this study may inspire further research connecting tax aggressiveness and CEO turnover, 
observing, for instance, the CEO's profile regarding their education level (degree, master, or Ph.D.), whether 
they were trained in a public or private educational institution, the CEOs background, religious preferences, 
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